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Abstract 
This paper focuses on how a latecomer country can bring a large (infrastructural) 
technological system (LTS) to a market already dominated by the entrenched 
systems of global technology leaders. We construct a conceptual framework, 
building on Hughes LTS theory (1983) and insights from social studies of 
technology into the specificities of infrastructural sociotechnical systems to 
analyse the development of China’s 3rd Generation mobile telephony system. We 
explore the complex dynamics surrounding the distributed governance of 
innovation, highlighting changes in key system builders. We note the role of the 
state in addressing critical problems (“reverse salients”), both in terms of aligning 
players through legitimating and sense-making and also, building the necessary 
mass and momentum. This includes a more radical reconfiguring of the field to 
secure the substantial commitments needed to materialise and embed a new LTS 
infrastructure. 
Keywords 
Large technological systems/infrastructures, latecomer country, mass and 
momentum, China, role of the state, distributed governance of innovation  
1. Introduction 
For the first two generations of mobile telephony, China was merely an adopter of 
foreign technologies. It had to pay ‘hundreds of millions of dollars’ every year for 2G 
patent licensing fees (Li 2011:48), in addition to five-hundred billion invested 
purchasing foreign 2G equipment (Liu 2016). Today, following the success of its third 
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generation TD-SCDMA (TD-LTE) mobile technology and standards (Stewart, Author, 
Graham and Wang 2011), China has become a key global player.  
Studies of technology catch-up by latecomer countries, deploying different 
analytical lenses, have reached very different verdicts about the possibility of success 
and its key determinants, and in particular the role of government. Despite the dominant 
position favouring laissez-faire approaches,  
The rapid development of East Asian economies has presented a challenge to prevalent 
neoliberal policy perspectives favouring laissez-faire approaches. Scholars from 
development studies analysing the success of the Asian Tigers and China's 
achievements have paid specific attention to differences in their development pathways 
and changes over time (Lall, 2003) and have highlighted the important role played by 
the state in development. However, there is the need to move beyond general 
prescriptions and achieve a clearer understanding of what roles the state must play and 
particular and at what stages in the prolonged technological catch-up process.  
Drawing upon science and technology studies (STS), rather than treating 
technology abstractly as a uniform, generic category, we explore the specificities of 
large infrastructural technological systems and examine the challenges facing latecomer 
countries - to catch up in a context dominated by existing international leaders, 
highlighting particularly the role of the state in system building. 
The foundational studies of ‘large technological systems’ (LTS) were originally 
developed by Hughes (1983, 1986, 1987; Mayntz and Hughes 1988). This paper 
integrates Hughes’ LTS theory with recent insights from studies of ICT infrastructural 
technological systems (Aanestad et al. 2007, Pipek and Wulf, 2009, Sahay et al. 2009).  
We suggest that newcomer countries are beset by enormous challenges and may find 
themselves locked out of the market by the entrenched technological systems of world 
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technology leaders. Conventional development approaches, which have tended to focus 
narrowly on the acquisition of ‘technical capabilities’, fail to see that the main obstacles 
are typically a mixture of social, economic and political elements (Khanna and Palepu 
1997) in addition to simply lacking knowledge, technical capabilities and resources, etc. 
We draw attention to the diverse roles played by the state, R&D and industrial agents, 
particularly in relation to LTSs underpinning core infrastructures, such as electricity 
networks, railroad networks, telephone systems and the internet (Geels, 2004, 2007).  
Against a background of many failures and fewer successful cases regarding 
LTS in newly industrialising economies, this paper analyses the case of China’s 
development of the TD-SCDMA (TD in short hereafter) 3rd Generation Mobile 
telephony system. We highlight the protracted and convoluted innovation journey, 
replete with unplanned turns and upheavals resulting from interactions between multiple 
players with diverging perspectives and commitments. We focus on the governance of 
these distributed processes of innovation (Acha and Cusmano 2005), highlighting how 
governance challenges and structures changed at various stages of development (Steen 
2011). By re-assessing the process of technology development, we find the most critical 
point is in the final phase of creating a new social-technical infrastructural ensemble. To 
implement and mature the new challenger system to the point at which it could compete 
with incumbent systems of world technology players required the mobilisation of 
enormous mass and momentum. This was achieved beforehand by radically 
reconfiguring the structure and dynamics of the telecommunications industry.  
We examine a number of closely intertwined social and technical factors that 
have often been conflated. We apply Hughes’ (19988) concept of “reverse salient” 
(Hughes 1988), to emphasise the complex temporal dynamics of the changing critical 
challenges encountered by a latecomer country, and discuss the “mass” and 
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“momentum” needed at a particular juncture in the pursuit of catch-up goals by a 
latecomer.  
This paper develops a conceptual framework for analysing the challenges faced 
by a latecomer country seeking to catch-up and build a large telecommunications 
infrastructural system. We then apply this framework to the case of China’s TD-
SCDMA 3G mobile telephony standard, which continues beyond 3G as TD-LTE and 
5G. 
2. Analytical framework: a latecomer’s perspective in the field of large and 
complex technological systems  
Hughes’ (1983, 1987) large technological system theory was one of the foundational 
contributions to discussions of the social construction (Bijker et al., 1987) or social 
shaping of technology (SST) (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985). A body of subsequent 
studies has examined the social and technical specificities of different forms of 
innovation in different contexts. Research highlights the enormous social and technical 
investments involved in the construction of LTS and infrastructural systems. Once 
established, the ‘social weight’ behind these entrenched elements makes them very 
difficult to displace (Collingridge 1980). This can create problems for latecomers. 
Strategies have been proposed for overcoming such entrenchment – most notably in 
relation to managing environmental transitions (Rip and Schot 2002, Geels 2004). 
These accounts have not yet attempted to understand the obstacles besetting latecomer 
countries developing LTSs; the hurdles that must be overcome at various stages of 
promoting a challenger technology; and the roles of R&D, industrial players and the 
state in emerging economies like China in bringing a new technology to market and 
helping it sustain in a competitive global context.  
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2.1 Large technological systems (LTS) 
 Science and technology studies (STS), and in particular the SST perspective, seek to 
‘open up the black box’ of technology (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985) and reveal how 
the historical context shapes technological development – and may itself be transformed 
in a process of mutual shaping. The concept of “large technological systems” introduced 
by Hughes (1983) in his historical studies of the creation of the electric power system in 
Western countries in the late 19th and early 20th century and subsequent studies of LTSs 
(for example, Davies, 1996; van der Vleuten, 2004, 2006, 2009) draw attention not only 
to obdurate technical challenges but also complex social elements involved in these 
technologies. They reinforce a central tenet of SST, about the need to treat technologies, 
especially large complex technological systems, as ‘heterogeneous assemblages’:  
taking into account the visions and beliefs, the techniques and practices of the various 
actors involved in the development, implementation, use and governance of an 
innovation (Williams and Pollock, 2012).  In these large complex assemblages, 
‘technical’ and ‘social’ elements are profoundly intertwined.  
Hughes analysed the development of the emergent electricity system, showing 
how the process changed over a number of different phases:  
• invention: the emergence of radical inventions with potential to be key elements 
of a new technological system;  
• development: how a nascent system is adapted to the economic, political and 
social world;  
• innovation: the changes necessary for bringing the technology to the market; 
• competition, growth and consolidation as the new system struggle to survive and 
strengthen its market position in competition with other technological systems.  
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Hughes defines these phases to distinguish their particular features, whilst noting that 
these phases may overlap and do not necessarily follow a sequential, linear order. The 
underlying point remains: building large complex technological systems may require a 
number of system builders able to mobilise and deploy the different sets of capabilities 
of players needed in specific phases of the development. 
Scholars of LTS share with others in technology and innovation studies an 
understanding that invention does not necessarily lead to innovation. Rather, inventor-
entrepreneurs (Hughes, 1983) and their associates must embody in their invention ‘the 
economic, political, and social characteristics that it needs for survival in the use world’ 
(Hughes, 1987: 62). Hughes places key (individual/ institutional) stakeholders - such as 
inventors, investors, policymakers - at the heart of the analysis of sociotechnical system 
development, highlighting the role of system builders (SBs). The ‘system builder’ roles 
need to change in order to overcome diverse “reverse salients” between phases. For 
example, system builders in the development and innovation phases, inventor-
entrepreneurs, may need to step aside and be replaced by manager-entrepreneurs in 
later phases (Hughes, 1983, p. 67-68).  
Hughes introduces the concept of ‘momentum’ to capture the influence of 
elements such as vested interests, fixed assets and sunk costs. This metaphor denotes 
that LTSs have a ‘mass’ of sociotechnical and organisational components and that 
together must be given velocity and direction (Hughes, 1983: 76. See also Tidd 2010; 
Schubert et al. 2013). This is a dialectical view of technological system-building 
whereby system builders construct and configure the system, which, in turn, impact on 
the LTS and the society in which it is embedded.  
Hughes uses the military term ‘reverse salient’ (further developed in Mayntz and 
Hughes 1988) to characterise the way in which critical unsolved problems hold up the 
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advancing ‘front’ of technology development and then become the focus of innovative 
effort.  
2.2 Sociotechnical specificities of large infrastructural technological system - 
lock-in effects  
Highly generalised accounts of technological innovation often misleadingly fail to 
differentiate between different technologies. LTSs like mobile telephony, forming the 
core of highly complex telecommunications infrastructures, have a number of 
distinctive features.  
First, most large complex technological infrastructures do not emerge de novo 
(Star and Ruhleder1996). They are never built from scratch. Rather, they build on, 
extend and enhance existing structures (Aanestad et al. 2007). Thus, they are strongly 
path-dependent (Sahay et al. 2009), erected on the foundations of previous innovation 
efforts and contexts.  Studies of ICT infrastructural systems have drawn attention to the 
installed base, encompassing existing components – such as technology artefacts, 
standards, organisational structures, business practices, behavioural patterns, and social 
preferences of the users (see Rönnbäck et al. 2006) – that shape further development 
trajectories and socio-technical regimes (Geels 2004). 
The notion of installed base draws attention to political and institutional settings 
and the rules and routines that players follow in conducting their activities at a 
particular time and social space. They may prove the most ‘weighty’ and intractable 
elements of infrastructural ICT systems (Edwards et al. 2009), as these elements are 
deeply embodied in prevailing technological systems - reflecting institutional power 
structure among networks of players. We categorise players into three types: 
governmental, industrial and specialist ‘technical’ communities including R&D. They 
shape the future direction of development of the technological system. These deeply-
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rooted sociotechnical entrenchments faced by new entrants from latecomer countries 
have often been overlooked, despite their enormous influence. 
Furthermore, these infrastructural systems are ‘networked technologies’ 
(Cowan, 1992), which exhibit what economists have described as powerful ‘network 
externalities’ (Katz and Shapiro, 1986, 1992, 1994, Shapiro and Varian 1999) - whereby 
adding new users increases the value of the system to each user without proportionate 
additional cost.  These network effects reinforce ‘lock-in’: giving existing operators 
with established technologies enormous economic advantages.  
These network effects are particularly pronounced with network technologies 
where interoperability and interconnectivity between components and systems are 
required. This manifests in the standardisation of ICT infrastructural technological 
systems. ICT standardisation can be seen as defining the assembly of existing and 
emerging components and systems with the social and political interests inscribed in 
them (Chillundo and Aanestad, 2005). Organisations may seek to package their patented 
component technologies within prospective standards. When standards are set and 
adopted within ICT infrastructures, they may become essential intellectual property 
(IP).  The IP owners of the technologies packaged within the standard are guaranteed 
effective monopoly within those systems, thereby generating significant economic 
gains. The growing volume of patenting activity associated with standards means that 
latecomer firms and emerging economies can be locked out of the developers’ club and 
‘trapped’ into merely playing a role as technology receivers: the more they resort to 
globally standardised systems, the greater the licensing fees they must pay. 
The standardisation of network technologies often becomes a battleground, 
shaped by the vested interests of powerful stakeholders (Brunsson, Rasche and Seidl, 
2012; Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000; van den Ende, van de Kaa, den Uijl and de Vries, 
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2012).  Considerable mass and momentum are needed to overcome lock-in and the 
entrenchment of existing providers (Geels 2007).   
2.3 Analytical framework for a latecomer country 
We build a generic model based on Hughes and STS. This is summarised in Figure 1, 
which seeks to capture the changing dynamics and system-building role for a latecomer 
country in creating a large infrastructural technology.  
Some flexibility is required when applying the LTS framework to the position of 
latecomers in the development of a large ICT infrastructural system, particularly in 
relation to Hughes’ analyses of electricity system development from its earliest stages. 
We divide the process into three phases. The first phase involves both creating a new 
prototype technology and securing (both national and international) regulatory approval. 
It is impossible for a latecomer to “invent” a wholly novel ICT infrastructural system 
from scratch. Many technical and institutional elements are already in place from 
entrenched competitor systems – accentuated by the imperative for technical 
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interoperability and connectivity; the direction of innovation is relatively established. 
The key uncertainties are whether the challenger can survive/prevail in the face of 
entrenched market leaders. The invention stage overlaps and becomes intertwined with 
development and innovation.  In this context the system builder needs to transcend the 
capabilities possessed by individual industrial and R&D players. The SB role requires 
gathering sufficient human and material resources and mobilising them in the same 
direction whilst confronting political and institutional barriers. These become salient in 
the second phase identified in this model where specific reverse salients need to be 
addressed through activities of sense-making, coordination and ultimately regulation 
and investment.  
A latecomer must develop a large and complex technological infrastructure and 
bring it to those (unattempted or emerging) markets not yet occupied by established 
players. In this third phase, the crucial challenge, as characterised by Geels (2004, 
2007), is to embed a promising ‘niche’ solution into the broader socio-technical regime 
to the point that it can compete with the entrenched systems of world leaders, who are 
already well positioned technologically and institutionally within the power structure of 
the international communities. Entering such a market demands an enormous force to 
bring a challenger system to the point that it can compete and bring in revenue. Many 
technological systems developed in newly industrialised countries have failed to reach 
the market with sufficient momentum (see e.g. Park, Kim and Nam, 2015, Lee, Mani 
and Mu 2012).   As we explore below this in the case of TD in China this was achieved 
by a significant reconfiguration of the socio-technical regime that transformed the 
structure and dynamics of the telecommunications industry and market. 
Figure 1 is constructed to illustrate the process with three phases staged by 
different “system builders” (Hughes’ term). It highlights the rapid mobilisation of 
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“mass” and “momentum” needed to enter the market in the overlapping phase of 
“development” and “innovation” and compete and earn revenue. We derive from 
Hughes’ LTS theories the concept of ‘momentum gap’ to elaborate the need to tackle 
various “reverse salients” to bring a prototype technology to the market. The 
“momentum gap” highlights two types of deficiencies in terms of lacking human and 
non-human resources and of the common goals/priorities of actors involved.  
Through this framework we unpick the diverse and changing “reverse salients” 
that must be overcome. These include, first, resource mobilisation to create sufficient 
“mass” including monetary and material inputs, the endeavours of governmental, R&D 
and industrial players across the entire supplier chain. Second is an effort of sense-
making needed to create meanings and legitimations that would capture the subjective 
goals of all in the “networks of agents” (Carlsoon and Stankierwicz, 1991, cited in 
Geels 2004), projecting a promising future “landscape” (Geels 2007) to convince them 
to move in a common direction. The insertion of developing economies in the Global 
Value Chain (Ernst and Kim 2012) means that many players from latecomer countries 
already belonged to the value chains/networks of the entrenched socio-technical 
regimes. Because of the complexity of modern ICT infrastructures, the new “networks 
of agents” required for a challenger system must go beyond the national and include 
overseas players. Key players in a latecomer economy may need to be weaned from the 
value chains of entrenched global players towards challenger technologies. That is to 
transform the existing dynamics of the market and to construct a new competitive 
environment. 
3. The evolution of China’s mobile technology capabilities 
The primary data sources were created through an investigation conducted in 2008-2010 
funded by European Union under 7th Framework Programme (see Stewart et al. 2011; 
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Author et al. 2013; and Author and Naughton 2013).i  The salience of the TD-SCDMA 
case and the sustained debates within China about its costs and indigenousness has 
thrown up an extensive body of grey literature, which provides rich resources for 
documenting this complex history and has also stimulated a number of independent 
analyses including Li (2009 in Chinese), Xia (2011), Yu (2011), Gao and Liu (2012) 
and Gao (2014). Though drawing attention to the indispensable role played by the state 
in these developments (Liu et al. 2011, Author and Naughton 2013, Gao 2014,) these 
analyses also highlight the pitfalls and uncertainties surrounding state intervention (Yu 
2011, van de Kaa et al. 2012). The debate around 3G TD-SCDMA continues. We have 
therefore reanalyzed this body of evidence to seek a more thorough understanding of the 
complex dynamics and varying roles of the state in the distributed governance of 
innovation (Suh, 2014). We discuss the kinds of state intervention that may be required 
at particular junctures and contexts. 
 33.1 The dynamics of TD system building 
Initially, Datang, an R&D firm affiliated with the Chinese Academy of 
Telecommunications Technology (CATT) under the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications (MPT), successfully led the development of TD-SCDMA to 
become one of the three third-generation (3G) mobile telephony standards in the world.  
Datang first recruited an overseas Chinese firm- Cwill (Author paper 2013) which 
possessed a core subsystem needed for TD (Author et al, 2013). Extending this strategy, 
it established collaboration with world-leading switching technology firms: Siemens 
and Alcatel-Shanghai Bell (Alcatel-Lucent 2010). During this period it gained political 
and financial support from its parent institution, CATT and MPT. R&D funds came not 
only from the MPT and subsequently the Ministry of Information Industry (formed by 
the merger of MPT and Ministry of Electrical Industries), but also from the State 
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Science and Technology Commission (which later became Ministry of Science and 
Technology - MOST). In June 1999, with the support of the Chinese Government, 
Datang Group put forward its TD-SCDMA mobile system for approval by the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the United Nations body responsible 
for telecommunications technology standards. In May 2000, the ITU approved three 
international 3G mobile telephony standards: two established standards - the US-centred 
CDMA-2000 and the Europe-centred WCDMA standards - and the Chinese newcomer 
TD-SCDMA. Technically, TD is based on Time-Division Duplex (in contrast to the 
Frequency-Division Duplex that the US and European systems are based on). The 
advantages and disadvantages of Time- versus Frequency- Division based mobile 
technologies are a subject of continuing debate amongst expert communities. In 
discussions of future 5G mobile standards, TD is described as better in terms of energy 
and frequency spectrum saving, effective in Multi-input-multi-output, whilst 
disadvantaged by the lack of prior established commercial interest.ii  
 Datang’s success culminated in the approval of the TD standard by the ITU. 
However, when facing the subsequent challenge of bringing TD from a prototype to a 
working product that could compete with incumbent systems, Datang found itself out of 
its depth, even with existing governmental support, in the face of a web of deeply 
intertwined and intractable problems.  
When ITU approved TD, it was still an immature technology; a newcomer 
which needed to make its way to the market in competition with the American CDMA-
2000 and European WCDMA. The latter were both mature products already operating 
in their respective markets, building upon an installed base of 1-2G systems. China’s 1-
2G mobile telephony was based upon the European standard. In the absence of a 
domestic 3G mobile infrastructure at home, many Chinese firms were producing 
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CDMA (US standard) and WCDMA (European standard) products ranging from 
handsets to large network equipment for the global market. Strong players like Huawei 
and ZTE had already invested to develop and supply their own 3G products to the 
American and European markets. China’s (1-2G) mobile network service providers 
including China Mobile were actively testing 3G network services based on those 
matured standard systems. All these factors meant that no firm would commit 
significant investments in TD. TD was then too risky for them.iii       
Within China there were sharp differences in view about whether it would be 
better to exploit available foreign technologies than invest in an ‘indigenous’ 
technology that was not yet market-ready. Critics argued that only a small portion of 
TD’s IP (perhaps as low as 7%) was Chinese (Author paper 2013). Given the situation, 
Datang’s initial grounds for developing “indigenous” standards became disputable.  
After the TD standard was accepted by the ITU, the whole world awaited 
China’s decision. Powerful global players pressed the Chinese government to promise 
‘technology neutrality’ between the three 3G mobile standards approved by the ITU. At 
the same time, domestic players were looking at the government for responses.   
The eventual action by the government, though delayed, surprised everyone for 
its decision to adopt all three 3G standards and for the scale and sophistication of 
government intervention at multiple levels (for details, see Stewart et al. 2011 and 
Author et al. 2013). Revisiting the state actions in a nutshell, a new super-ministry, the 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) was formed, merging two 
rival ministries to overcome internal organisational frictions.iv Shortly afterwards, the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Finance and 
MIIT jointly issued an ‘Announcement on Deepening the Reform of the Structure of the 
Telecommunications Sector’ (23 May 2008). This document singled out China Mobile 
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for criticism for its sceptical attitudes towards TD and stated that China Mobile had no 
choice other than to devote itself to the implementation of TD-SCDMA. The new 
minister, Li Yizhong, held a public meeting with TD-SCDMA technical experts and 
discussed further advances of TD-SCDMA’s implementation. The president of China 
Mobile made a sharp U-turn, declaring that China Mobile will ‘make every effort’ to 
ensure excellent TD-SCDMA service in time for the Beijing 2008 Olympic games! 
Under the convenorship of the NDRC, directly led by the State Council, MIIT and other 
related government departments formed a cross-ministry coordinating group to oversee 
the implementation of thirty-four TD-related special work packages. By August 2008 
the first licences for TD-SCDMA handset production were issued by the MIIT, and 
plans for commercialisation were laid out.  
A major structural reform/reorganisation was undertaken in the 
telecommunications sector. The six existing state-owned operators were consolidated 
into three key players to compete in all telecommunications services – one for each of 
the international standards.  MIIT issued three 3G licences in early 2009: China 
UNICOM was awarded the European-centred WCDMA standard, China Telecom the 
‘US’ CDMA standard, and China Mobile, the largest player, was given the challenge of 
bringing to market services based on the home-grown Chinese TD-SCDMA standard. 
Figure 2 summarises the process. 
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The development of TD was not a straightforward outcome of top-down state planning 
but emerged through protracted and complex, multi-level negotiations between diverse 
players. In the initial phase integrating invention with innovation and development, the 
R&D oriented enterprise, Datang was the key player. The particular challenges it faced 
as a system builder, went far beyond its possession of specialist technical knowledge in 
the field. No less important was its ability to form partnerships and alliances with 
various industrial players including not only domestic but international ones. Some of 
the alliances cut across, and were potentially in conflict with, the web of interests in the 
existing socio-technical space of incumbent competitor systems. Datang also had to 
play an effective role in the political domain in order to gain support from the array of 
governmental players.  
3.2 Momentum gap and the role of the state  
In the face of the entrenched technological systems of powerful global 
incumbents, securing ITU approval did not guarantee the survival of TD, nor help 
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Datang and other Chinese industrial players to secure a level-playing position in the 
market and an equal status in the international technology communities. TD’s success or 
failure would have a significant consequence to China, if it wanted to avoid being 
locked-out of the mobile technology innovation arena and having to continue to pay 
hundreds of billions in licensing fees to the world leaders.  China needed to find a way 
to develop the embryonic 3G TD standard technologies to the point it could survive and 
consolidate itself in a market dominated by the entrenched systems of global players.  
This was a new game where a player like Datang did not have the considerable 
“weight” needed to get the world to budge even a little. The size of the Chinese market 
provided exceptional opportunities and was the key to securing commercial support 
from industry players and bringing TD to the market. However mobilising this mass and 
momentum was achieved in this case by radically reconfiguration of the 
telecommunications industry and the market, to create the conditions in which TD was 
able to grow, mature and compete with entrenched competitors. 
 
There was a “momentum gap” to overcome (see Figure 2), where the state had 
to step in. This was not only in its overt stance that supported TD, but through also a 
range of direct and indirect actions, which brought significant changes in the field. Two 
key programmes secured the foundations for the long-term development of TD and 
boosted the morale of the stakeholders involved from the R&D, industry and 
government. State intervention brought together all R&D and industrial players along 
the entire supply chain, from suppliers of various component technologies to core 
network capabilities, RAN (radio access network), terminal, mobile handset systems, 
chips, testing instrument, antenna and direct amplifier stations, etc. The TD Industrial 
Alliance established in 2002 received behind the scenes support from the state, which 
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provided political and financial resources needed for the project (for details see Stewart, 
et al. 2013). The forcible recruitment of China Mobile into the Alliance in 2008 
completed the supply/value chain.v China Mobile immediately became a member of the 
Board of Directors and took over leadership in the industrialisation/commercialisation 
of TD. China Mobile took over as the TD system builder in the third phase. The 
leverage could best utilise for accumulating ‘mass’ and ‘momentum’ was the size of the 
Chinese market (which since 2003 had possessed the world’s largest number of 
consumers).  
China Mobile was chosen deliberately by the state, which had created two 
significant effects. As China Mobile was, at the time, the most successful service 
operator with the largest user-base in the market and deepest pockets. Shifting its 
allegiance from WCDMA and CDMA to TD dramatically weakened the commercial 
prospect of competitor systems in the Chinese market and changed the dynamics in the 
field. With the track record of commercial business experiences, China Mobile was able 
to turn TD development plans into practical business actions, including the development 
of handsets, terminals and network equipment and testing and improving the quality and 
launching services.   
As Hughes pointed out, the diverse vested interests of different players often 
become the thorniest obstacles, preventing the large array of actors across the supply 
chain from forming a “mass” that could achieve “momentum” and work effectively in 
the same direction.  
These issues were key in the process of TD development. Many industrial 
players were attracted to Chinese 3rd generation mobile infrastructure technologies. 
However, they had to weigh the pros and cons, and consider the risks if they invested in 
a new technology which was far from mature compared to the US and European ones. 
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To compound the problem, many Chinese firms, such as Huawei, ZTE and others, had 
already become involved in the already established global value chains (Ernst and Kim 
2002), offering low-priced component technologies (handsets; exchanges) for 
incumbent mobile systems. 
In contrast to stereotypical portrayals of the homogeneity of views in China, 
there have been sharp controversies over TD expressed in the media, academia as well 
as government.  TD’s ‘indigenousness’ was severely challenged for some time. Datang 
was criticised for pursuing its vested interests and reputation while wasting huge 
amounts of money and resources on a technology that had limited claims to be 
“indigenous”. Like other infrastructural technologies, TD-SCDMA did not simply 
emerge de novo (Aanestad et al. 2007). Rather, it built upon various essential 
components and sub-systems, including, for example, some historical patents from its 
US CDMA rival. Even the idea of using TD (time-division) instead of FD (frequency 
division) that underpins other two rival standards originally came from Siemens 
(Stewart et al. 2011)!  For consumers, however, the ‘indigenousness’ of technologies 
may not be meaningful at all. Interoperability of TD, WCDMA and CDMA2000 would 
be much more beneficial for mobile users.  
The dispute between supporters and opponents of TD-SCDMA regarding its 
‘indigenousness’ continued during the whole development process but became intense 
at various points (Stewart et al. 2011). Without the public support of the state at the 
highest level, the whole programme could have been jeopardized. The state was the 
only player able to set at ease the concerns of these industrial players, and change the 
dynamic amongst them from competition to collaboration over TD.  
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3.3 Distinctive features of state intervention in the Chinese contexts  
Writers have noted the indispensable role (Gao 2014; Liews 2005) played by the 
state in the development of TD. However, it is unhelpful to over-generalise the role the 
state is required to play over different technologies, moments and contexts. We observe 
particular features of Chinese state intervention, which have to be understood in the 
Chinese context. 
There is a popular misconception that the Chinese Government is a uniform 
entity. The TD case demonstrates that various government departments had diverging 
perspectives and acted differently on this issue. The Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST), which provides grants for new science and technology 
development in supporting R&D institutions like Datang, had always been a keen 
promoter of TD. The Ministry of Information Industries in contrast prioritised overall 
industrial growth, for which meeting domestic demand came first, and   
“indigenousness” secondary (author et al. 2013). In a hierarchical political structure, the 
State Council has power and authority to coordinate, despite the diverse goals of 
individual ministries, convening national strategies and restructuring the ministries 
when necessary.  
The TD case displays also some subtleties of its interventions. The final national 
strategy of TD development perhaps uniquely guaranteed a space for the US and EU 
standards alongside the Chinese. The mobile sector was restructured to create three 
large state operators, each with a license for a particular system, to compete head-on in 
the market on the national network in a seemingly level playing field.  
This draws our attention to distinctive features of intervention by the Chinese 
state. We note the cautious and flexible way in which the state interpreted national 
interest. Initially cautious about adopting a ‘techno-nationalist’ stance (Suttmeier and 
Yao 2004) (in contrast to accounts by Western lobbyists), its eventual position struck a 
  21 
balance between a variety of perspectives. Adopting all three mobile systems was 
economically inefficient. However installing TD alone would be risky and might isolate 
China from technology development in a world where interoperability and connectivity 
are essential. A longer-term consequence has been that Chinese players, for many 
practical reasons, have moved swiftly to next-generation technologies including TD-
LTE and 5G mobile technologies and are now amongst the leading global players in the 
field. 
Second is the state’s ability to intervene. This revolves around its ability to 
coordinate across a number of spheres (e.g. public research, frequency allocation, 
standardisation) coupled with the considerable authority vested in the Chinese state. At 
key decision-making junctures, major R&D and industrial actors, whether state-owned 
or private, looked to the state for answers.vi We also note that at key moments when 
particular governmental actors encountered limits in their ability to intervene, a higher 
level actor would be brought in to form new national strategies. In the case of TD, 
moving into the third phase involved a more profound reconfiguration of the socio-
technical infrastructural ensemble was required. We use the terminology of 
reconfiguration of the ensemble, rather than the related but more generic concept of 
regime change (Geels 2004), to unpick specific changes in innovation dynamics in the 
TD case. This included successive shifts in the lead system builder role, first, from 
innovation players to governmental and then to industrial players. The substantial 
investments needed to physically materialise and mature the prototype infrastructure to 
the point where it could compete in a market dominated by incumbent systems of world 
technology players called for mobilisation of substantial mass and momentum and was 
achieved a transformation of the structure competitive dynamics in China’s 
telecommunication industry.  
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Though concerted state intervention proved crucial, particularly in the case of a 
latecomer economy, this is by no means a story about unilateral action by powerful state 
structures – quite the reverse.  The state could not ignore the close interconnections 
between global arrays of players involved in creating interoperable elements that are 
woven into infrastructural LTS. This was displayed in the protracted debate over the 
pursuit of TD, in which government intervention was delayed to allow deliberation and 
adjustment of its own structures and strategies.  
4. Conclusion 
Large-scale ICT infrastructural technologies embody complex social elements rooted in 
the relations between stakeholders and also the power structures of the socio-technical 
worlds in which the innovation processes take place. A latecomer country faces multiple 
challenges as new hopeful systems must confront the entrenchment of already-
established systems. The state was called in to play a key role at the conjuncture of 
bringing prototype technologies to the stage of finished products that can operate in the 
network infrastructure and compete in the market. It was beyond the capacity of 
individual R&D or industrial players to overcome the multiple interlocking ‘reverse 
salients’ that constituted the ‘momentum gap’. What was lacking was not just resources, 
but also effective governance, mobilising and channelling resources and players towards 
the same goals. This study shows the importance of the relationship between R&D and 
industrial players and the state, the distributed governance of innovation: aligning and 
mobilising each other according to the circumstances and needs arising at particular 
times.  
This observation about the key role played by state intervention may need to be 
considered in relation to the specific context and the practical functions such 
intervention fulfils. Some elements may well be specific to the particular historical 
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context and may disappear as China’s social and economic transition continues over 
time. Moreover, these observations pertain particularly to distributed innovations in 
large-scale, physical infrastructures – whose roll-out requires enormous investments 
(see also Suh, 2014). A corollary of our emphasis on sociotechnical specificities is that 
other technologies may exhibit different innovation dynamics and associated 
governance challenges due to differences in scale, complexity, levels of investment 
required, etc. (particularly, for example, software technologies and internet services). 
These observations highlight potential limitations of this paper.  This paper arose from 
an effort to examine features of a number of recent episodes in which China had sought 
to develop key ICT capacities. The goal was to develop and test a model, based upon 
Hughes (1988), through retrospective reanalysis of historical cases (only one of which is 
presented here). Issues arise about generalizability from particular cases, particularly in 
retrospective studies. A key priority will be to conduct additional historical, and if 
possible, longitudinal studies, through which the complex flows of influence in system 
building in different settings may be explored.  
Lessons may, however, only become apparent in the longer-term. Today, TD-
SCDMA has been more or less replaced by TD-LTE and other new standards. However, 
though entrenching TD in the market required costly efforts, the experience Chinese 
players gained in exploiting R&D and in standardisation has allowed them to become 
key players in the international club of mobile technology developers, that would 
otherwise have continued as an exclusive preserve dominated by players from America 
and Western Europe. 
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i Details removed for review. 
ii See “What’s The Difference Between FDD And TDD?” ElectronicDesign 30.06.2012, 
http://www.electronicdesign.com/communications/what-s-difference-between-fdd-and-tdd. 
iii A discussion with the ZTE delegate taking part in the panel discussion in China-EU ICT 
standards workshop (Beijing 20 April 2009). 
iv Telephone interview with Prof Wu, Academician of Chinese Academy of Engineering and a 
renowned strategist for national telecommunications and information systems (April 2009). 
v TDIA had 50 members then, according to Chinese Telecommunication Network 114, 
http://www.c114.com.cn/news/22/c5355.html, last accessed on 10.05.2018. 
vi Pressure for stronger state intervention grew where entrenched global innovation systems and 
value chains were seen as unfavourable for Chinese players.  
                                                 
